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ABSTRACT 
WEB-DINAR: 
WEB BASED DIAGNOSIS OF NETWORK AND APPLICATION RESOURCES IN 
DISASTER RESPONSE SYSTEMS 
 
KARTIK DESHPANDE, B.E., PESIT BANGALORE 
M.S.E.C.E, UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor Aura Ganz 
 
Disaster management and emergency response mechanisms are coming of age post 
9/11. Paper based triaging and evacuation is slowly being replaced with much advanced 
mechanisms using remote clients (Laptops, Thin clients, PDAs), RFiDs etc. This 
reflects a modern trend to deploy Information Technology (IT) in disaster management. 
IT elements provide a great a deal of flexibility and seamlessness in the communication 
of information. The information flowing is so critical that, loss of data is not at all 
acceptable. Loss of data would mean loss of critical medical information portraying the 
disaster scenario. This would amount to a wrong picture being painted of the disaster 
incident. This basic idea led to the motivation of DiNAR (Diagnosis of Network and 
Application Resource). The aim of DiNAR was to remotely monitor all the components 
of the deployed system infrastructure (Remote clients, Servers) and if there is a fault in 
the infrastructure (Hardware, Software or Communication) DiNAR captures the fault 
alarm and do an event correlation to find the source of the problem.  
The biggest challenge that lies here is the fact that the entities we are trying to monitor 
are scattered around in the Internet. Traditional network management techniques always 
assume that the network is within administrative control and every device we monitor is 
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easily reachable on demand. But the ad-hoc scenario of deployment of disaster 
management systems makes this task non trivial. 
DiNAR has been designed with an aim to work with any application which has its 
infrastructure elements scattered in the Internet space. DIORAMA (A real time disaster 
management system) represents a new series of applications (especially in medical field) 
where the deployment of network infrastructure is scattered around with Internet being 
the backbone connector. Another such example is the Intel® Health Guide PHS6000 
[1], which is used in patient monitoring in homes. This thesis work uses DIORAMA as 
a case study application used to prove the concept of DiNAR. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
“Disasters are events that disrupt the normal functioning of the economy and society on 
a large scale” [7]. One word to describe disaster events is complex. This complexity 
comes from the sudden and abrupt nature of disasters. It disrupts the normal socio-
economic setup. Thus it is very essential that disaster response management is handled 
by a specialized set of trained people in handling such events. It also needs a very 
thoughtful and streamlined process. Emergency Medical Services (EMS) experts believe 
that there are four major phases in disaster: “mitigation, preparedness, response, and 
recovery” [7].  Of these four phases, the response and recovery from disaster pose the 
biggest challenges for EMS officials. Disaster management has been a very vibrant area 
of research from technological perspective off late. Till recently, it was considered a 
much localized phenomenon where the efforts were based more on local resources and 
organizations [7]. 
Disaster response management has seen significant growth in terms of technology and 
processes after 9/11. One of the major reasons to this can be attributed to the need for 
good evacuation and victim tracking mechanism, the lack of which contributed to 
significant casualties during 9/11 and previous disasters. The traditional EMS disaster 
evacuation process involved paramedics using paper tags with different color codes to 
represent the victim condition [2]. The victims were tagged with these paper tags with 
their corresponding color code. The paramedic then establishes contact with a command 
center using the available communication mechanisms like satellite phones or other 
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media to report the victims' statistics. This primitive method is now being replaced by 
use of modern sensing technology and Internet. This advancement in technology adds 
speed and ease of managing the information generated at the disaster site.  
 
1.1. Example Of Information Technology (IT) In Disaster Management:  
 
Figure 1.IT In Disaster Management [12] 
 
A normal setup of disaster management system consists of a “Disaster Site” from where 
emergency medical information is being collected and a “Remote Site” which is the 
information sink for all the data. 
Figure 1 shows an emergency response network with its main components such as  
1) Wireless network devices deployed at the disaster site (used for both wireless local 
area network communication and cellular communication). Such devices interconnect 
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the devices in the disaster site as well as relay the information from the disaster site to 
the remote site.  
2) Computing and sensing devices at the disaster site such as Remote clients, RFID 
readers. Such devices collect the relevant information from the disaster site, process it 
and transmit it to the remote servers through the 
This setup can change depending on the technology used to relay the information to the 
remote site from the disaster site. If each device is empowered with Interconnectivity 
using 3G/GPRS or other cellular technologies, the topology will look slightly different. 
But the method of information collection across the two sites still remains the same. 
 
1.2. Motivation for Dinar: 
Modern day disaster management has Information Technology (IT) as a major player in 
it. The activities which involve IT in this process are, identifying the EMS and related 
resources, establishing connectivity with these resources and deploying them where 
needed. This is then followed by coordinating the activities and providing 
communication between various geographically separated locations [7]. The National 
Academic Report (2007) [7] on use of IT for emergency response management gives us 
some of the examples of application of IT in disaster response management. Some of 
these use modern sensing technologies like RFID, sensor networks coupled with 
wireless networks, Internet etc to provide an end to end solution for disaster 
management. Thus forming a mini overlay network with the Internet as its backbone. 
One of the primary motives of applying IT to disaster management is to provide quick 
communication methodology and faster response time. It also helps in quickly building 
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a high level view of the disaster scene. On a broad sense, it can be visualized as building 
a seamless information flow from the site of disaster to the command centers where 
actual decisions to act are taken. 
Although IT makes disaster response management quick and simple, the biggest 
question mark on its practical applicability lies in its reliability. It uses various elements 
of IT like: 
1. Internet 
2. Remote clients and Servers 
3. Wireless networking devices 
4. Etc. 
And all these elements have inherent potential to fail or to be mis-configured. Failure to 
operate of any entity in any section of the information flow could lead to loss of the 
critical information. This information lost would reflect in a wrong perception being 
printed about the disaster. This is a potentially very dangerous situation. Use of 
technology to solve problem can be potentially disastrous if the reliability is not 
properly addressed. But we need to understand that the IT elements which constitute 
disaster management systems are very volatile. Below are few of the scenarios of failure 
of components which are common: 
1. Application crashes 
2. Device power outage 
3. Wireless network access issues 
4. Internet outages 
` 
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Thus any of the above scenarios would lead to loss of information which is getting 
generated dynamically from the disaster site. It is very essential to understand the 
criticality of this information which is getting lost. This information is getting generated 
seamlessly from the disaster site and represents the state of victims. For example, an 
application reading data from RFID readers could crash and lead to complete blacking 
out of the RFID reader. This is not a hardware fault or a communication problem. Yet 
the information is lost. This would mean loss of vital victim statistics. Hence every 
piece of information being carried is very critical and there is a vulnerability of losing it. 
Reliability is a big concern in a volatile system like this, or for that matter any enterprise 
network. In practical world, failures cannot be avoided. But the robustness of a system 
depends on how quick the failure is detected and recovered from. Traditional enterprise 
networks invest heavily on softwares that do automated network management. Despite 
of the sophisticated softwares, these networks still need the expertise of human element 
in the form network administrators. But the rapidly deployed networks used in disaster 
management face a very rare set of challenges. They are: 
1. Lack of trained technical personnel on site to manage IT infrastructure failure. 
2. The remote site network setups are very ad-hoc in nature and done in a short 
span of time. 
3. Certain failures in connectivity and data flow can never be recognized as 
everything would look perfect from the outside. 
Thus these new challenges should be addressed in a new way. The National Academics 
report on “Improving Disaster Management: The Role of IT in Mitigation, 
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery” [7] says that both agility and robustness of 
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the IT infrastructure is very crucial for the proper operation of the disaster management 
systems. Although it is a great idea to have a very robust and reliable system which is 
operational and keeps information floating all the while, from a more technical 
perspective it is important to understand that the entire IT infrastructure is volatile and 
prone to failure. Thus we need a solution which makes the disaster management system 
more agile and responsive to failures.  
So with these factors in mind, we designed a reactive solution to address the 
vulnerability of disaster management systems: DINAR, Diagnosis of Network and 
Application Resources using a web based model. It is a network management 
methodology adapted to suite the nature of disaster management and similar systems.  
Chapter 2 describes the Backgroud and Related Work. In chapter 3 we introduce 
DiNAR and talk about its architecture and design. This is followed by implementation 
details in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 presents the System evaluation and results.  
` 
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
Network resource management has been a traditional research problem. Over the years 
multiple solutions have been proposed and implemented. Simple Network Management 
Protocol (SNMP) [3] has been predominantly used by many commercial products. 
SNMP uses a Manager-Agent model, where every managed node in the network hosts a 
SNMP agent which reports health information to the SNMP manager. The architecture 
of an SNMP based management system is as shown in Figure. 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 2 SNMP Architecture 
 
SNMP Manager is a centralized node which is responsible for collecting the network 
information from each individual node which is running an SNMP Agent. The agent is 
software running on every node which collects health information about the local 
hardware and software environment. This information is stored in a localized database 
known as Management Information Base (MIB). SNMP assumes the entire manageable 
network to be under one administrative domain.  
SNMP 
Manager 
SNMP 
Agent 
MIB 
SNMP Messages 
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Outside SNMP, there have been lots of efforts in designing network management 
systems for different application scenarios.  We will briefly explore three such designs. 
 
1. Web Based Enterprise Management (WBEM): 
 WBEM [6] brings interoperability among management solution providers. It was 
introduced by Distributed Management Task Force to standardize the XML based 
network management protocols. XML based methods are a new class of management 
standards which use XML for data representation. WBEM defines a set of management 
and Internet standards to bring together management of distributed environments. 
WBEM is defined by three main components: 
 Common Information Model (CIM): CIM is a standard which defines how to model 
network, application and other business processes in enterprise and service provider 
environments. It uses a standard object oriented structure using classes, properties, 
methods and relations (also known as associations).  
 HttpAccess: Http acts as the transport mechanism in WBEM. HttpAccess 
component defines the specifics of http requests used to perform the CIM operations 
over the network. 
 XmlCIM: WBEM defines xmlCIM which defines the xml grammar for mapping the 
CIM classes into XML elements and the CIM class properties into attributes. This is 
done by defining the XML Document Type Data (DTD). The DTDs specify the 
XML grammar for CIM. This component holds a very important key in achieving 
Interoperability. 
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With use of XML and HTTP WBEM has overcome one of the limitations posed by 
SNMP, i.e. the management traffic will not be blocked by service providers as it looks 
same as a web traffic. But the manager would still need the exact IP or URL to access 
the devices. This cannot be expected in the typical emergency response setup. This 
inspires for the design of a system management method which suits this special scenario 
where different entities are scattered across the Internet.  
 
2.   Ad-hoc Network Management Protocol (ANMP) [14]: 
 ANMP is a management framework with special design considerations for ad-hoc 
networks, mainly used in battlefield and emergency response systems [14]. It uses a 
policy based management mechanism. The network requirements are expressed as high 
level policies. There is a hierarchy of policy agents which realize these policies and also 
report management information to a global policy agent. ANMP was developed with 
two basic motives: 
 It should be lightweight and suitable for Ad hoc networks. 
 It should be compatible with SNMP. 
ANMP uses its version of MIB to store the information of the Ad hoc network devices. 
It also supports alarms like SNMP traps to have asynchronous reporting of problems. 
  
3. Yelp Announce Protocol (YAP): 
YAP is a network configuration management scheme [15] which collects configuration 
settings from all the managed entities and stores them. The YAP architecture consists of 
a YAP Server and multiple YAP Relays. YAP Relays are like SNMP agents, but with a 
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difference. Instead of responding to requests from the manager, they relay the 
management information at regular intervals to the YAP server. The YAP server on the 
other hand collects as well as distributes configuration information through the relays. 
This theme of relaying data from the YAP Agents (Relays) without being polled by the 
manager, presents an interesting idea and food for thought. This scheme, although very 
pertinent to collection of configuration information, can also be applied to network 
health information collection. 
As discussed earlier, emergency response systems and applications like Diorama pose a 
special set of challenges on the management methodology. This makes choosing of one 
among the above said protocols directly difficult. The primary reasons for this are:  
 Non existence of a single administrative domain: All management solutions expect 
all the nodes to be within the same administrative domain. However, in emergency 
response networks, infrastructure elements are in separate sites and are connected 
through the Internet. Thus having one administrative domain is ruled out. 
 Explicit addressing: Explicit addressing of managed nodes is a must. However, we 
can not provide such guarantee for a volatile and mobile network like the disaster 
management network. 
In the next section we introduce DiNAR management solution which overcomes these 
challenges while using some of the principles used in all three of the modern network 
management methods presented above. DiNAR has been developed to adapt to 
applications of different needs. In this thesis work, Diorama has been used as a case 
study for implementing the proof of DiNAR concept. In the rest of the document, we 
use Diorama as an example under all scenarios. 
` 
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CHAPTER 3 
DINAR: CONCEPT, DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 
 
We understood in the previous chapters that present day network management methods 
altough effective and robust, are not suitable for applications which have infrastructure 
elements scattered across internet and rely on Internet as a backbone. It should be noted 
that we are not considering multiple office sites connected via VPN (over internet) as an 
example of such an application. Figure 1 shows a typical example of the target 
application. Ex. Diorama [Appendix A]. The primary reasons why SNMP, WBEM and 
other existing architectures cannot be used for applications like DIORAMA are: 
 The communication between the manager and the agents goes through networks 
which are outside the administrative controls. 
 Lack of explicit addressing. There is no direct way the manager can contact the 
agents and vice-versa using the addressing scheme (IP). 
To overcome these challenges, DiNAR has been designed with the following design 
goals: 
 Provide seamless information flow between agents and managers irrespective of 
the locations of the agents (provided there is network connectivity) 
 Use a Push paradigm instead of a request response paradigm to overcome the 
need of explicit addressing. 
 Finally to have the system as simple as possible at the disaster site. The aim is to 
avoid any configuration or setting up processes on the disaster site by the 
paramedics.  
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3.1. Dinar Architecture 
DiNAR architecture follows a Manager-Agent based model and draws inspiration from 
WBEM[6] and YAP[14] in the way management information is represented and 
collected. DiNAR architecture consists of two main entities, the DiNAR manager and 
agent. An agent is a daemon service installed on all managed nodes in the field like 
PDAs, laptops, wireless routers etc. While a Manager which resides on a server in the 
remote control center is a central application to which agents report the management 
information. Figure 3 depicts the DiNAR architecture over the Diorama setup shown in 
Figure 1.  
            
 
Figure 3.DiNAR Architecture 
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As shown in Figure 3, DiNAR consists of the following three major components: 
1) DiNAR Manager: Manager is the centralized web server which collects information 
about all the nodes in the infrastructure. A detailed architecture of the manager and its 
subcomponents is discussed later in the chapter. 
2) DiNAR Agent: Agent is a daemon process running on every computing node in the 
system (Remote clients, Web servers etc). Its job is to collect the health information of 
its environment and report it to the Manager. More details about the agent are discussed 
later in the chapter. 
3) Directory Server: The directory server helps the agents to locate the manager on the 
World Wide Web. This acts a single point of reference to manager location and leaves 
the manager location flexible. More details about the directory server are discussed later 
in the chapter. 
We now begin to analyze each component of DiNAR in greater detail and how they help 
in achieving the design goals of DiNAR. 
 
3.2. Dinar Agent 
The DINAR agent is a process which runs on every managed device. Its primary  tasks 
are: 
 Collect status parameters for the device on which it is running and also from 
interfaced gadgets and applications running on the same machine. 
 Contact and establish connection with the DINAR Manager. 
 Send updates at regular pre decided intervals . 
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The agent is an independent application running on the device and has no relation  with 
the other applications that are running. Figure 4 shows a block diagram view of an 
agent.  The functionality of an agent has been split into multiple components with a 
motive to keep things simple and modularized. It also allows future expansion and 
customization of the agent. Let us look into each component in detail: 
 
 
          
 
        
 
 
To Manager 
Figure 4 DiNAR Agent architecture 
 
 Agent Daemon:  This is the main backbone process which controls all the other 
components of an agent. Whenever the agent is started, it is this daemon process 
which kicks off. One of the initial tasks for this daemon is to locate the manager and 
initiate a contact. Locating the manager is achieved using the Directory server which 
is described in greater detail. So as of now we can safely assume that the manager 
location (URL) is known. After the initial contact with the manager, the agent starts 
the information engine and receives regular updates from it. This update information 
is structured and passed onto the manager at regular intervals. Thus agent daemon is 
AgentDaemon 
Generic
Adapter 
App 
Adapter 
XYZ 
Adapter 
Information Engine 
HttpClientModule 
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the nucleus of the DINAR agent and controls all its operation. 
 HttpClient module: This is the communication engine of the agent. The agent 
communicates with the manager using the Http protocol. The HttpClient module 
manages the establishment and maintenance of the Http Connection with the 
manager. It uses the Apache HttpClient 3.1 library to perform all the Http 
operations. It also tries to maintain only one connection to the manager throughout 
and keep this connection persistent. This means all Http messages will be sent on 
the same TCP connection. Persistence is achieved using Http 1.1 which pipelines 
multiple requests onto same HTTP connection. DiNAR manager expects the 
connection from the agent to last until it’s operational in the field under ideal 
circumstances. The manager sets a timeout value of 60 seconds. This means any 
agent idle beyond 60 seconds is considered to be unreachable for the moment. 
Although this does not brand the Agent or the link to be down. The manager does 
further processing to determine if agent is truly down. More details about event 
processing done by the manager are described in Section 3.3.4 (Analysis Engine).  
 Information Engine: The information engine is like the Management Information 
Base (MIB) in SNMP. It stores all the relevant and needed status parameters and 
tracks them continuously. As described above, the agent daemon interfaces with the 
information engine to get hold of the current state of the machine and pass the 
information. The information engine in itself is of not much value. It just acts a 
central docking point for all information adapters. Information Adapters are 
specialized modules for continuously monitoring a certain environment and getting 
its state information. In Figure 4, all modules displayed in blue represent 
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information adapters. They are started in cascade to the Information engine. 
Individual adapters are invoked by the Information Engine at a predefined interval to 
collect the present state information for the components they are responsible. E.g. an 
adapter responsible for collecting the health information of all the aplications on the 
Diorama server is invoked every x seconds where x is configurable based on the 
user’s requirement. “x” here is called the refresh interval. DiNAR sets the default 
value of 60 seconds. This is arrived at based on the tests conducted on the 
performance of the Agent process for varying refresh interval. We then did a trade 
off between the performance and the freshness of the information to conclude 60 
seconds as an ideal refresh interval. 
 Information Adapters: As mentioned above information adapters are specialized 
modules for continuously monitoring a certain environment and getting its state 
information. The number and class of adapters can be customized. If the device is a 
hand-held device in the field, then it can have adapters for the interfaced gadgets, 
applications etc. If the device is a central web server, then it would mainly contain 
application adapters. The application adapters keep track of all the managed 
applications and monitor their status continuously.  We developed an application 
adapter for Servers and other Client machines running windows. This gives us the 
dynamic availability and performance statistics of the listed applications. Apart from 
the specific adapters, all agents have a mandatory generic adapter. The function of 
generic adapter is to gather vital parameters of the health of the machine itself like 
CPU usage, memory usage etc. Except the generic adapter, the rest are optional. 
This architectural decision on information adapters will help in making DINAR 
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apply to wide variety of scenarios. Anybody can write a custom adapter and plug it 
into the agent. This can help a great deal in customizing the agent according to the 
needs. We developed the generic adapter and an application adapter for windows 
environment.  
 
3.2.1. XML Representation 
As discussed above, XML is used to model the management information. In this section 
we will take a look at sample XML update sent from an agent and understand its 
structure: 
 
 
 
 
    
 
As shown above, every agent update begins with a “DINAR” start tag. This is followed 
by the tag which represents the type of device which is reporting.  Within this we have 
the XML tags representing the components which the agent is collecting data for. In 
Start Element 
DeviceType 
Component Tag 
MetaTag 
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some cases there can be meta tags like the one shown above e.g. 
DINAR_GenericAppHeader. The meta tag is used by adapters to group multiple peer 
tags coming from same adapter. 
 
3.2.3. Agent ID  
AgentId is the unique id to represent the agent in the manager repository. To ensure 
uniqueness across multiple sites, we use the MAC address of the device to be its 
AgentID. This helps maintaining the uniqueness off the agent. 
 
3.2.2. Agent Bootup and Configuration: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.Manager Agent interaction 
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As soon as the agent boots up and knows the URL at which the manager is residing, it 
first issues an HTTP request with messageType set to “Hi”. Along with this, it also 
sends a polling interval, which indicates to the manager the frequency with which it 
should expect updates. If the manager receives all this information correctly, then it 
would send a “Hi” response. The agent which receives the “Hi” response now knows 
that the initial handshake has ended succesfully. The agent now sends the skeleton XML 
document which represents the device, applications and the attached gadgets which the 
agent will be monitoring. There are no status updates in this XML document, just the 
skeletal XML. After receiving this skeletal document successfully the manager sends 
back an ACK to indicate to the agent that everything was received successfully. After 
the ACK is received, the agent starts a timer and after every t secs (equal to polling 
interval) it sends out the update XML document. Figure 5 depicts these handshake 
messages. This continues unless and until the agent or the manager are stopped or the 
communication is affected. 
 
3.3. Dinar Manager 
DiNAR manager is the focal point of the whole DiNAR system. It is the information 
sink for all the DiNAR agents running across the environment. Hence we can define the 
DiNAR manager as a central application which receives and processes the management 
information. The manager can also be visualized as a web server listening for agent 
updates on one of the Http ports. The Figure.6 shows the block diagram view of the 
DINAR Manager and its components. 
 Manager Servlet:  This module acts as a global interface of the manager. It listens 
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on the assigned manager port and accepts the updates from all the agents. The 
updates from the agents are in XML format. The servlet extracts the xml data and 
passes it to the XML parser for further processing. 
 XML Parser: The XML parser module parses the incoming xml data from the 
servlet and creates objects for each of the Element in the xml document. DiNAR 
manager uses a DOM parser. Each Incoming XML tag is converted into an object 
(except few meta tags) defined in the Data model (Explained in section 3.3.2).  
 Object Pool: The DINAR manager looks at every device and its components and 
attachments as an object defined in its Data model. Even the DINAR agent is 
represented as an object in the pool. It instantiates an object for every new device or 
component it manages. This object is an abstraction of the real device. Whenever 
updates are received for an already created object, only the property of the object is 
updated. Objects follow the class structure defined in the DiNAR data model which 
represents the blueprint of the topology and all its classes. 
 Alarm Module: This module is responsible for triggering alarms based on 
the properties of the objects in the object repositories. The agents transmit 
abnormal activity reports using the status attribute for each object. Based on 
this, the alarm module triggers alarms to highlight the problem. These alarms 
are then picked up by the analysis engine for alarm correlation. 
 Analysis Engine: The goal of this module is to analyze the management data 
received from the agents. It consists of an event correlation engine which correlates 
the alarms. The Analysis engine is explained in greater detail in section 3.3.4.  
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Agent updates 
 
 
Figure 6.DINAR Manager Architecture 
 
3.3.1. Alarm Model 
Alarm model defines the set of alarms that can be triggered by the Alarm Module. It is 
very specific to the application for which DiNAR is being used. We developed an alarm 
model for DIORAMA[Appendix A] application.  Figure 7 shows the alarm model for 
DIORAMA application.  
The alarm model is implemented as an inheritance of Java classes where each event 
inherits from a parent event. In Figure 7, Event is the base alarm which contains basic 
properties of an alarm. This is then inherited by the other other alarms as shown in the 
Figure 7. 
 
 
 
Object Repository 
Manager  
Servlet 
Analysis Engine 
XML 
Parser 
Alarm 
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Figure 7.DIORAMA Alarm Model 
 
3.3.2 Data Model 
DiNAR Data Model is the blueprint which the DiNAR manager uses in creating the 
abstract topology. The is represented by an interrelated set of classes which are specific 
to an application. In this section we will demonstrate the modeling of DIORAMA 
system. Data model forms an important part of the application as all the objects in the 
object pool of the manager depend on the data model. For the purpose of DIORAMA, 
we designed a data model encompassing all the components of DIORAMA. Figure 8 
below shows the complete data model for DIORAMA. Each of the class is represented 
using a rectangular box. For example DINAR_ClientDevice is a class which represents 
any generic computing device in the disaster site. These classes are then linked using 
arrows. These arrows indicate class inheritance. Lets consider the DINAR_ClientDevice 
example. This class has two subclasses: DINAR_TrackDevice and DINAR_SiteDevice. 
The former represents a D-Track device as defined by DIORAMA [Appendix A] while 
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the later represents a generic purpose remote client. The arrows used always point 
towards the base class. Other than the directed arrows, the other connections between 
the classes are known as relationships between them. Relationships are all unidirectional 
and each relationship has a converse to it. 
The naming of the classes and the relations has been done following the CIM 
guidelines. CIM classes are named in two strings separated using an “_”. The first string 
is known as the domain name and should be constant throughout the model. This model 
all in all represents the entire DIORAMA system. Figure 8 shows the diorama data 
model. In this model, even DINAR_Agent is treated as an object and as a part of the 
repository. 
    
Figure 8.DiNAR Data Model for DIORAMA 
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3.3.3. Cloud Aggregation 
DiNAR was aimed to be applied on distributed applications which have multiple sites 
and whose elements interact over the internet E.g DIORAMA [Appendix A]. In 
DIORAMA, the disaster site devices connect to the internet using a wireless LAN 
(WLAN). This wireless LAN comprises of a wireless router. To model this network 
scenario, we defined a new entity in the DiNAR model known as “Cloud”. A cloud is 
meant to represent a particular disaster site location. Every agent sending updates from a 
particular disaster site is believed to behind a cloud representing its site. Figure 9 shows 
a capture from the DiNAR console where two agents reporting from the same site are 
clubbed under a single cloud. 
 
 
Figure 9.Cloud 
 
The source IP of the HTTP connection coming into the manager is used to define a 
cloud. All agents within a single WLAN will be having the same source public IP. 
 
3.3.4 Analysis Engine 
The analysis engine is the module responsible for performing alarm correlation on all 
the triggered alarms in the DiNAR repository. Figure 10 shows a block diagram view of  
` 
25 
 
the analysis engine and its components. 
 
Figure 10.Analysis Engine 
 
 Dependency Graph: Our Analysis engine has been built using the Dependency 
graph based event correlation algorithm [8]. Dependency graph is a mechanism 
where the different classes in the data model share a dependency relationship 
between them. This dependency can be read as “Fault in class A will lead to 
Fault in class B” [8]. Thus class B is dependent on A. This schema helps us to 
build a hierarchical structure of dependencies among components. The alarm 
correlation algorithm uses the dependency graph as an input. To build the 
dependency graph we use the DiNAR Data model as a reference for 
relationships between the devices. While designing the dependency graph we 
condensed the graph as much as possible to its base classes. Thus if any class in 
the Data Model is not shown in the dependency graph, its base class needs to be 
looked up. Figure 11 below shows the Dependency graph for DIORAMA. 
` 
26 
 
            
 
Figure 11.Dependency Graph 
 
 Correlator: The correlation algorithm uses the dependency graph to reach to the 
root cause of a fault. It correlates multiple alarms and filters out alarms which 
are caused due to failure in parent components. It also helps in pointing out the 
more pertinent problem, resolution of which can be a possible resolution of the 
other. Although this might not be always true. The dependency graph correlation 
algorithm [8] implemented in DiNAR works as explained below 
o The correlator kicks in every 60 seconds and builds the dependency 
graph using the above blueprint. 
o It then traces through the graph and assigns respective alarms to each 
object (if any). 
o It then marks all the leaf nodes with alarms and starts analysing them in a 
loop 
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o For every alarm in a node, it checks to see if the object on which it 
depends has an alarm. We define a certain set of alarms to be unrelated. 
E.g a HighCPUUtilization alarm on the Application server is not related 
to an ApplicationDown alarm although Application Classes are 
dependent on the DINAR_Node class. If the alarms in the parent and the 
child object are not Unrelated, then the alarm in the parent is considered 
to be the cause of the algorithm in the child object.  
o If the alarm in the parent object is concluded as the cause then the alarm 
in child object is marked as a symptom and the parent object alarm is 
now processed recurcively. If not, the child object alarm is itself marked 
as a root cause. 
 
3.4. Directory Server 
Locating a manager involves finding the exact hostname (or IP) and the http port on 
which it is listening. Launching a full fledged directory service would mean, the agents 
having the capability of finding the manager address using broadcast. However this is 
not feasible in the present setup. So we add a step of indirection to reach to the actual 
manager. Instead of the manager's address, all the agents would contain the address of a 
pre coded directory server. This directory server will then know the address to the actual 
manager. So as soon as the agents boot up, they will first contact the directory server 
and request for the location of the manager. The directory server responds with the 
manager URL. Hence with one additional step, the agent can get the manager address 
dynamically. Even if the manager location changes, only the directory server needs to be 
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updated and not all the agents. Thus, this approach is more scalable. The requirements 
of a directory server are to have a URL which is constant all the time. 
 
    
Figure 12.Directory Server Operation 
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CHAPTER 4 
IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS 
4.1 Dinar Agent: 
 
This has been implemented in core Java SE. Some of the highlights of the agent 
development were: 
 It is a single threaded application. This was done mainly due to 
 Reduce load on the agent machines 
 Agent has a fixed update interval. Hence data collected between update 
cycles is of not much use if overwritten 
 Uses HttpClient 4.0 module to perform http 1.1 operations. 
 Agent was developed only on Java Standard Edition. Hence it cannot be ported to a 
mobile device. Attempts to port the agent onto a mobile device were not succesful 
owing to the stripped down version of the Java Mobile Edition which does not 
support the core HttpClient 4.0 API. Hence development of agent on mobile devices 
needs to be done using the local development frameworks provided by the vendor. 
 It uses the NSClient service to pull the health information from Windows hosts like 
uptime, cpuUtilization. 
 
4.2 Dinar Manager 
DiNAR manager is a multithreaded J2EE application. It contains of two main threads: 
 Thread 1 : Main thread responsible for collecting updates from agents and 
creating the abstract topology 
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 Thread 2 : Alarm correlation engine thread 
Manager uses the XML Schema Definition (XSD) to validate the incoming data before 
processing the agent updates.  
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CHAPTER 5 
SYSTEM EVALUATION 
 
The previous chapter described the details of DiNAR system architecture and 
implementation. To summarize, DiNAR system can be broadly visualized as shown by 
Figure 13. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13.DiNAR Summarized 
 
The system evaluation strategy was concentrated on segregating every independent 
component of the system and testing it individually. It was the followed by a complete 
feature testing to test the resultant output of the system. This chapter discusses the 
testing schemes, parameters considered and the test bench details followed by the results 
of the system evaluation. 
5.1. Testing Scheme: 
DiNAR system evaluation tests have been classified as: 
 Tests in the Monitoring phase. 
 Tests in the Diagnosis phase. 
Figure 14 below shows the DiNAR test model and the functionality being tested at the 
end of every phase (sub phase).  The system evaluation used two testing methodology. 
1) Live topology testing. 
2) Simulated topology using test bench. 
 
Diagnosis / Alarm 
Correlation 
 
Monitoring 
XML Data from 
field agents 
Alarms Root Cause 
Faults 
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Figure 14.Testing Model 
 
1) Live topology testing: DiNAR agents were deployed in three laptops running 
Windows operating system and on a web server running a server version of Windows. 
One of the laptop agents was made to portray as a mobile device agent. The web server 
agent was in a separate cloud thean the rest. The manager collected health information 
from all the agents. Faults were induced into this setup. We used the Network Fault 
Model (NFM) [11] which defines 5 different types of faults possible in a networked 
application. 
 Drop 
Faults on components 
(Persistent and spurious faults) 
Network Fault Model [11] 
Alarms Correlator : 
Dependency Graph 
Algorithm 
* 
Alarm Generation 
Abstract Topology 
Generation 
Test 1 
Test 2 
Test 3 
Root Cause 
Faults 
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 Cut 
 Lost 
 Corrupt 
 Carrier 
NFM faults are designed for individual packets, but as DiNAR abstracts packet level 
details, we considered every HTTP request/communication as an atomic entity and 
applied this model. 
2) Simulated topology using test bench. 
We developed a test bench to simulate multiple agents. Each agent is feeded with a 
separate configuration file and an internal topology. The agents in the test bench 
function like any normal agents, except that it does not have an Information Engine. It 
picks up the topology information from a hard coded XML. The agentID of the 
simulated agents is preassigned using a configuration file.  
The test bench introduced the faults as mentioned in the Network Fault model [11] 
using a FaultInduction thread. This thread is a daemon which introduces faults by. 
 Stopping and starting agents. 
 Changing status information of individual components. 
 
5.2. Test Cases and Results 
Figure 14 shows three tests (Test1, Test2 and Test3) conducted at various breakpoints in 
the DiNAR system. Apart from these, we conducted two more tests to understand the 
performance of the system and to obtain optimal update and refresh time intervals. In 
this section we look and analyze the results of the tests. 
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5.2.1. Test 1: Abstraction Accuracy 
Abstraction accuracy is the measure of closeness between the actual topology in the 
field to the abstracted topology in DiNAR manager. We define this metric based on the 
relationships between each component. To measure this subjective metric, we used the 
following technique: 
 On the agent side,  
o (a1) Every component (sub component) to be measured is assigned 1 
point.  
o (a2) Every relationship to be built is assigned 1 point. 
 On the Manager side 
o (m1) Every component seen on the manager is assigned one point.  
o (m2) Every correctly built relationship between the components by the 
manager is assigned one point. 
 (a3 and m3) Finally, the correct grouping of agents under respective clouds 
(reflecting their locations physically) needs to be considered. To correctly 
capture this metric, we assign 1 point for every cloud object seen on the manager 
(a3) and 1 point for every remote site under consideration(m3). 
All the points from both the agent side and the manager side are summed up. The 
Abstraction Accuracy is finally calculated as 
(m1 + m2 + a3) * 100 / (a1 + a2 +m3)  
Note that m3 and a3 are swapped to give a correct meaning. Theoretically it is not 
possible to get m3 < a3. 
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We conducted tests using the live physical topology as mentioned in section 4.1 and 
simulated agents using the DiNAR test bench with varying number of agents (1-6) 
under each site. The topology consisted of two sites to depict the disaster site and the 
command center.  
Results: 
The tests were conducted considering the following assumption. All agents in a single 
site were connected to Internet through a wireless LAN which had a single vertical 
connection. This meant all of them were behind a natted gateway. Under these 
circumstances we observed 100% accuracy in abstraction. 
The other network setup which should ideally be considered is when every agent device 
has a separate vertical link. This is scenario when every client device in the disaster site 
has 3G connectivity and the site has no internal LAN. From DiNAR perspective, the 
topology remains the same per agent. The only factor that gets affected is the 
classification of agents into respective Clouds. This depends on the external IP of the 
device individually unlike the case of a LAN network.  The external IP is allotted by the 
base station to these 3G clients using their Access Point Names (APNs) and is not 
consistent for all the devices. We could not completely test this network scneario due to 
lack of enough hardware for 3G/GPRS connectivity. But we observed the assignment of 
external IPs using 4 iPhones with 3g connectivity. It was observed that irrespective of 
same location, all of them got separate external IPs all the time. This would mean 
DiNAR manager will show all 4 of them in separate clouds. 
Thus assuming we had hypothetical agents installed on each of these iPhone, the 
abstraction accuracy of this scenario would be (x)/(x + 3). 
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Where x is the sum of points for all other components. 
5.2.2. Test 2: Spurious alarm suppression 
One of the biggest challenges faced by Network management systems is the ability to 
handle spurious alarms. Spurious alarms are unavoidable in any network scenario. Such 
alarms originate mainly due to: 
 Temporary loss of connectivity 
 Temporary unresponsiveness of applications. 
 Etc. 
DiNAR uses a wait and hold approach to handle spurious. The wait time before an event 
is considered non spurious is equal to two update cycles. To test spurious alarm 
suppression and robustness of DiNAR we used the Network Fault Model (NFM) [11] 
which defines 5 types of faults possible in a packet based network. Although it’s not 
completely appropriate in our scenario, we only consider a subset of this model. The 
fault types Drop, Lost, Corrupt are relevant in DiNAR perspective. The other two, 
Carrier and Cut are very specific to packet level granularity and are not relevant in a 
system which abstracts at the level of HTTP. 
Test: The goal of this test is to check the robustness of DiNAR against errors and 
spurious alarms. The test bed was created using the DiNAR test bench. The topology 
consisted of 3 simulated agents per site and two such sites. The update interval was set 
to 60 seconds. The Network Fault Model was then applied by inducing the following 
faults: 
 Drop: We induced this fault by introducing syntactical errors in the XML being 
sent. This leads to the server dropping this update. 
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 Loss: This error type was achieved by stopping the agent for a varied time 
intervals between 0 seconds to 180 seconds (at samples of 10 seconds) 
successively. The time instance at which the agent is stopped is also critical in 
this test. For this we chose the two extreme ends. The agent was paused once 
immediately after a previous update. We called this as t=0. The next test had the 
agent stopped right before an update. We called this as t=60.  
 Corrupt: Corrupted data can be of many forms. In our tests we considered 
corrupted data in two ways. 
o Wrong status information about components. Involved flipping of the 
status from Running to Crashed etc. We flipped the status information of 
components. 5 such components retained this curruption for a single 
update cycle, while remaining 5 components retained this corrupted 
status information for 2 or 3 update cycles. 
o Syntactically correct, yet semantically wrong information which does not 
mean anything from DiNAR perspective. This test involved changing the 
“status” attribute of a component to “XYZ” and keeping it same for 10 
consecutive update cycles. 
Results:  
 Drop: All the syntactically errorenous XML messages were rejected without any 
failure. But as the HTTP connection is still alive, an Unresponsive alarm for the 
device is not fired and this was a just result. Yet this was logged in the server 
logs but not shown in the GUI as a design consideration. 
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 Loss: We tabulated the percentage of spurious alarms suppressed under both the 
cases and is shown in Table 1 below. The suppression window shows the 
minimum amount of time for which spurious alarms can be suppressed for two 
different values of “t”. 
Time Instance (t) Suppression Window (in sec) 
0 180 
60 120 
 
Table 1 Spurious alarm Suppression Window                                       
 
 Corrupt: For the two types of data corruption mentioned above: 
o Wrong status values:  
 For all the components which held the corrupted data for just 1 
update cycle and then the corrected values were injected, DiNAR 
manager was successful in suppressing the alarms as transitive 
and no alarm was generated. 
 For the components which transmitted the corrupted data for 2 or 
3 update cycles and then cleared the alarm, alarms was generated 
which eventually were cleared. However, these were shown on 
the GUI and were a part of the Alarm Correlation process. 
o All incoherent values in the XML input from the agents were ignored by 
the DiNAR manager.  Yet this was logged in the server logs but not 
shown in the GUI as a design consideration. 
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5.2.3. Test 3: Diagnosis Phase testing  
In Chapter 3 we introduced the dependency graph event correlation technique to 
diagnose the alarms generated by the DiNAR agents. To measure the effectiveness of 
this method in our application, we used the following two metric. 
 Convergence time: This metric indicates time taken for the dependency graph 
algorithm to reach to its final conclusion. It is measured from the time the algorithm 
is invoked with a set of alarms to the time it reaches its final conclusion. 
 Percentage False positives/False negatives of root cause detection: This metric 
indicates the number of faults wrongly detected (or not detected) in the experimental 
setup. 
Test Conducted: 
To compute the convergence time of the correlation algorithm, we used the simulated 
test bench with 20 agents. The performance of the dependency graph based correlation 
algorithm depends on the depth of the graph (L) for every correlation [8]. Based on the 
dependency graph for DIORAMA, we have maximum depth of L=3. Our test cases 
consisted of generating 1-20 alarms of both L=2 and L=3 depth. We calculated the time 
taken by the correlation algorithm to reach to its end for each of the 20 X 2 cases. Figure 
15 shows the plot of convergence time against number of alarms in the system. 
One factor which affected the convergence time was the thread dispatching schedule of 
the JVM as correlation engine is a separate Java thread. However we reduced the effect 
of thread dispatch by having no I/O statements. 
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Figure 15.Convergence Time 
 
Correlation accuracy and false positives: Event correlation in DiNAR unlike other 
network management applications is less complex. This is due to the unidirectional 
architecture of dependencies. Accuracy in correlation is a metric to measure the 
outcome of the event correlator. In the above experimental setup, following were the 
shortcomings observed in our event correlation engine. 
1. A Device down alarm which was adjudged as the root cause overruled 
other actual alarms from its components (E.g. Application down) even though 
the later was a correct alarm and not a symptom of Device being down.  
2. Cloud unresponsive alarm is based on the status of all the agents. It 
assumes that if all agents are down, then there is a network level problem in the 
site (Cloud).  
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Apart from these two, the correlation engine was successful in showcasing the correct 
and the most pertinent problem with highest amount of severity. Although point number 
1 above discusses a behavior of the engine where actual alarms from subcomponents are 
suppressed by actual alarms from its dependent component, it does prove to be logical 
from administrative point of view. For example, in a case where we have an alarm for 
both the Device and its hosted application being down, it is logical to advise the 
administrator to first look at the Device failure problem. Table 2 shows a summary of 
the results of correlation for different failure scenarios. 
Failure Scenario 
Correlation Algorithm 
Successful in pointing to all the 
right problems? 
Only ApplicationUnresponsive Yes 
Only ApplicationDown Yes 
Only HighCPUUtilization Yes 
Only RfidReaderDown Yes 
Application and Host device 
Down 
Yes 
RFiD Reader and Host device 
Down 
Yes 
RFiD Reader and Interfacing 
application Down 
Yes 
RFiD Reader, Host device and 
Interfacing Application Down 
Not Always 
Application/RFiD reader Down 
along with High CPU Utilization 
in the host device 
Yes 
All agents in cloud Down Yes 
Only 1 agent in the cloud is Up Yes 
 
 
Table 2 Summary of Correlation Results 
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5.3. Agent Overhead: 
In this section we discuss the overhead posed by the Agent running on the devices. We 
consider two types of overhead here: 
 Bandwidth Overhead 
 CPU Overhead 
5.3.1. Bandwidth Overhead 
Bandwidth overhead is measured as the additional bits per second (bps) contributed by 
each agent. To measure this metric, the test setup consisted of four live agents 
connected to the internet through a wireless LAN. We used the Cradle Point setup as 
used in a real DIORAMA scenario. The test consisted a mock 10 min sessions involving 
all the 4 agents reporting health information about the device and monitoring 3 
applications. For each 10 min sessions we varied the update interval ranging from 10 
seconds to 120 seconds and measured the bandwidth addition (in terms of bits per 
second) by each agent. The bandwidth was measured for the entire http flow between 
the agent and the manager. 
Figure 16 shows the per agent bandwidth contribution for different update intervals. It 
needs to be noted that, these values are specific to the amount of information being sent, 
which depends on the number of information adapters. If there is significant increase in 
the number of information adapters, then the bandwidth addition will be higher. 
However, the relative proportions will remain the same. 
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Figure 16 Bandwidth Overhead 
5.3.2. CPU Overhead 
CPU overhead is a measure of the processing overhead added by running the Agent on 
the agent devices. To measure the CPU over head we calculated the total time taken by 
one update cycle of the agent.  This involves the time to collect information from all the 
adapters and transmit it across to the manger. For the test scenario mentioned in section 
5.3.1, the average CPU time for one update cycle of the agent is 1224 ms.  
For the mock 10 min test scenario, with varying update intervals, the total CPU time can 
be represented as 1224*U ms, where U is the number of update cycles. The lower the 
update interval, higher is the value of U and more is the CPU overhead. 
 
5.3.3. Choice of Update Interval 
The results obtained in section 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 helps us understand the choice of 60 
seconds as the ideal update interval for all DiNAR agents. Figure 16 shows the varying 
bandwidth overhead for varying update intervals for a fixed duration of time.  Based on 
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this, it is ideal to have longer update intervals which reduce the overall overhead of the 
agent. But longer update intervals lead to less fresh data at the manager. It also means 
slow realization of failures by the Manager.  Table 3 displays the minimum time needed 
to fire the Device and Component alarms for different update intervals.  
Update 
Interval 
Device 
Alarms 
(Sec) 
Component 
Alarms 
(Sec) 
10 80 20 
20 100 40 
30 120 60 
40 140 80 
50 160 100 
60 180 120 
70 200 140 
80 220 160 
90 240 180 
100 260 200 
110 280 220 
120 300 240 
Table 3Alarm Generation Time 
 
As seen in Table 3, the time needed to trigger an alarm after a failure grows significantly 
for higher update intervals. For update interval of 120 seconds, the time to obtain device 
failure alarm is 5 mins. This is a very long time period for a scenario like DIORAMA 
where the actual times of operations. At the other end of the table, the duration to trigger 
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device alarms are in the range of 80/100 seconds. The duration for component alarms is 
20/40 seconds. This is a very less amount of time to trigger the alarm considering the 
transient failures. Such low time periods for alarm generation will also affect the 
windows size for spurious alarm suppression as discussed in section 5.2.2.  
Thus the choice of update interval was made considering a tradeoff between alarm 
generation time and agent overhead. Hence update interval ranging between 50-70 
seconds is a good design choice considering the trade offs. 
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CHAPTER 6 
REPAIR AND RECOVERY MEASURES FOR DIORAMA 
 
In chapters 3, 4 and 5 we presented the details of DiNAR system and its evaluation 
results. DiNAR as a tool helps guide the system administrator to have a complete view 
of the IT infrastructure elements of DIORAMA. It helps detect the faults and analyze 
these fault alarms through an alarm correlation engine. In this chapter we attempt to 
provide the corrective actions that can be invoked based the alarms raised by DiNAR. 
To understand these corrective measures, we divide the whole DIORAMA setup into its 
two predominant zones 
 Disaster site 
 Remote site (Command Center) 
6.1. Disaster Site 
The disaster site is the area which generates the information about a particular disaster 
which has just occurred. This information being generated is very critical to the correct 
portrayal of the actual scenario. DIORAMA [Appendix A] uses PDAs and RFiD readers 
to collect information about the victim’s position and this information is transmitted to 
the Remote server using the wireless LAN. 
Disaster response activities are conducted for a short duration of time. This duration 
depends on the seriousness of the calamity. So disaster response systems are active and 
operational only during this period. Unlike regular wired and wireless networks, 
Disaster response systems like DIORAMA are setup and dismantled once the activity is 
over. Hence the requirement of the IT infrastructure in systems like DIORAMA is not 
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perennial. However, that does not undermine the need of high availability of these 
components during the actual times of operation. Rather they are very critical during the 
operational periods.  
A complete recovery model for a disaster response system like DIORAMA is beyond 
the scope of this work. Hence here we provide the suggestive measures the 
administrators can take for different types of fault alarms triggered by DiNAR. For 
DIORAMA, whose availability requirements range from very high during the times of 
operation to almost zero once the evacuations are done, the recovery measures for IT 
related failures should involve sufficient amount of redundancy of hardware like 
wireless routers, 3G cards, remote clients like PDAs/Laptops, RFiD readers. 
Below we discuss different fault types detected by DiNAR in our present 
implementation for DIORAMA and the recovery measures: 
 Application Failure: At the disaster site, application failures could mean inability 
to read information from the RFiD readers. Hence if the correlation algorithm 
tags the RFiD reader interfacing application as root cause failure, then the 
administrator looking at this picture should instruct the paramedics at the 
disaster site to, restart the application on the tracking device. If this fault is 
accompanied with a non root cause alarm for the RFiD reader, then it is 
advisable to look at the operational status of the RFiD reader as well. 
 Application Unresponsive: If any application is being reported as unresponsive, 
then its status should be monitored for 2-3 update cycles. This is to allow the 
application to become responsive again, as it is not an uncommon event for an 
application to not respond at certain intervals. If the alarm does not clear, the 
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administrator should direct the paramedics about the situation and restart this 
application. 
 RFiD-Reader Down: Hard failures of the RFiD reader will lead to a root cause 
fault being shown in the DiNAR GUI. The administrator should immediately 
direct the paramedic to replace the concerned reader and restart the interfacing 
application to do the initial handshake. This is needed considering the 
importance of the RFiD reader in the whole setup of DIORAMA and also the 
fact that troubleshooting it will take more time in an already time critical 
application. 
 Device Down: This alarm applies to a non responsive agent which is declared to 
be down by the DiNAR manager. Handling this alarm will be relatively different 
than the others as described above. It is due to the fact that this alarm is deduced 
due to an agent which did not respond for two update cycles followed by 1 mins 
wait time. This could have three possible causes: 
o Device failure (shutdown/reboot) 
o Agent Failure (Agent application crash) 
o Network failure. Unable to connect to the Internet. 
We will deal with the recovery steps for “Network Failure” later. From 
DIORAMA perspective, the recovery steps should involve: 
 
 Check to see if the device is up and running. Make sure the agent is 
running. This can be done by tailing the agent logs. The other method 
would be to check the DIORAMA server to see if the device is 
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reporting data. If so it is an agent failure and the agent needs to be 
restart. 
 If the device is down physically, then it should be replaced with a 
backup device before beginning the troubleshooting.  
 
Checking for the agent failure before the more severe possibility makes sure that the 
DiNAR operations does to hamper the core operations of DIORAMA.  
 Cloud Unresponsive: A CloudUnresponsive alarm hints at a problem in the 
network connectivity. This is triggered when all the agents behind a particular 
cloud are down. The administrator should direct the paramedics to first replace 
the existing wireless gateway with a backup (having same SSID) and make sure 
all the devices are reconnected to the new wireless gateway. If this still does not 
clear the alarm, then each and every agent should be checked as explained 
above. 
6.2. Remote Site 
Remote site in DIORAMA is normally a command center with good wired network 
connectivity and high performance servers. Hence recovery measures in this site are not 
as complicated as in the disaster site. Failures in remote site would include: 
 Application Down/Unresponsive 
 Server failure 
 Network failure 
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The failures on the remote server, once detected can be corrected by regular 
hardware/software/network recovery processes. It does not need any special instructions 
unlike components in the disaster site.  
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Design of DiNAR was aimed to be an end to end solution for managing disaster 
response systems and provide real time fault detection. This thesis work was an effort to 
prove this concept. With its current architecture and implementation, DiNAR can also 
apply to other distributed application scenarios which have their elements distributed 
and use only internet to connect among themselves, with no overlays. One other 
example of such application is an Intel Health Guide [1] which is an in house patient 
monitoring system. Nevertheless, disaster management systems are still the most 
relevant applications for DiNAR.  
The main contribution of this thesis work in designing DiNAR was the design and 
implementation of the DiNAR manager-agent architecture and agent initiated collection 
method. We implemented the analysis engine using the dependency graph algorithm 
which helped DiNAR from just being a collection schema to a solution. 
Future Work: 
 One of the wrong design choices of DiNAR was the use of external IP for 
grouping agents in a cloud. This mechanism is not flexible to accommodate the 
usage of cellular network for data connectivity. Hence new methods should be 
explored. 
 Developing the agent for more platforms, mainly mobile device. 
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APPENDIX 
DIORAMA OVERVIEW 
DIORAMA is a system designed with an aim to expedite the EMS triaging process. It is 
a solution designed by the Multimedia Networking Lab, University of Massachusetts, 
Amherst. It uses the active RfID technology to track the victims after disaster and 
collects all the data about the victims, their locations and beams it to a server which is 
on the other side of the Internet. 
Diorama System Architecture:  Figure 18 shows the system architecture of 
DIORAMA. On a broad level DIORAMA can be visualized to be divided into two 
zones: 
 Disaster Site: Where the actual disaster has occurred and where the 
Emergency MS triaging process will be carried out. 
 Remote Site: The place where a server resides and collects all information 
from the disaster site. 
The disaster site can be visualized as an open area which has been affected and has 
victims scattered around. This is shown in Figure 17. Each of the circular zones is one 
disaster site. Normal Emergency Medical Services (EMS) procedures [2] involves a 
triaging round where the paramedics arrive at the disaster site and triage the victims 
using paper tags. These tags contain information about the victim and his present status. 
Although this triaging technique has been in place since a long time, applying modern 
day Information Technology (IT) to it can revolutionize the whole process. This is what 
DIORAMA aims to achieve. 
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Figure 17 DIORAMA Overview 
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